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Abstract 
 
Contingency theory suggests that that an appropriate match must be made between strategy and 
industry environment conditions. This study compared contingency theory expectations with the 
associations between perceptions of industry environment conditions and reported firm strategy, 
as reported by the firm’s president and national sales manager. Confirming theory expectations, 
there were significant and positive associations between perceived industry technical/market tur-
bulence and reported growth/differentiation strategy as well as significant and negative associa-
tions with low cost strategy. The direction and significance of these associations were similar re-
gardless of which manager supplied the perception of technical/market turbulence or the reported 
strategy. However there were differences across the two manager’s reports in the associations be-
tween strategy and perceptions of product differentiation, customer differentiation, and competi-
tive intensity. Confirming theory expectations, there were significant and positive associations be-
tween perceptions of industry competitive intensity and the sales manager’s reported use of low 
cost strategy, but not the president’s reported use of that strategy. Confirming theory expectations, 
there was a significant and positive association between the president’s (but not the sales manag-
er’s) perceptions of industry product differentiation and manager’s reported use of 
growth/differentiation strategy.  There was a significant and positive association between the sales 
manager’s (but not the president’s) perceptions of industry customer differentiation and manag-
er’s reported use of growth/differentiation strategy. The president’s and sales manager’s percep-
tions of product and customer differentiation had significant negative associations with the sales 
manager’s (but not the president’s) reported use of low cost strategy. The authors discuss poten-
tial explanations for these results and implications for managers. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
ince traditional contingency theorists saw strategies as necessary responses to environments, rather than 
influencer of environments, their tone has been considered deterministic (Child, 1972). Child argues for 
strategic choice, indicating that different strategies with very different structural requisites may thrive in 
very similar environments. Previous research (e.g. Dess and Davis, 1984) has established that Porter’s generic strat-
egies  of  differentiation,   cost leadership,  and  focus  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Miller  (1988)  argued  that  
____________________ 
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environment can and should influence strategy (Dess and Beard, 1984). He also argued that strategy should influ-
ence the environment, causing firms to gravitate toward customers with particular preferences and inviting retalia-
tion in kind from competitors (Lenz, 1981). His study suggested that strategies must be matched with complementa-
ry environments and structures to promote success.  
 
 Miller (1988) has measured the influence of environment perceptions of dynamism and heterogeneity on 
reported differentiation or low cost strategies using the self-reports of firm presidents. However, it is possible that 
the general variables of dynamism and heterogeneity may not adequately capture strategy-environment relation-
ships. Dynamism may stem from changes in customer preferences or from changes in industry production technolo-
gy or from new product technology. Hambrick and Lei’s results (1985) indicate that customer and product differen-
tiation are significant contingency variables in the strategy-performance relationship. Groups of customers are diffe-
rentiated if their needs and buying motives are different. Products are differentiated if customers perceive significant 
differences in the features and benefits of competitive products. Sheth (1985) argues for a conceptualization of busi-
ness markets based on product and customer differentiation. In addition, Porter (1980) argues that competitive inten-
sity is a significant influence on strategy determination. Thus it appropriate to extend Miller’s research to study the 
relationships between strategies, product/customer differentiation, and competitive intensity. 
 
 In addition, while firm presidents are responsible for strategic planning, national sales managers are re-
sponsible for implementing strategy. There could be significant differences between firm presidents and sales man-
agers in the intended strategy of the president compared to realize strategy implemented by the sales manager. These 
differences could be influenced by differences in judgment as to what actions are appropriate for the firm’s envi-
ronment, especially if there are differences in the perceptions as to the nature of the environment. The president’s 
judgments are influenced by concerns for firm profitability and internal efficiencies, while the national sales manag-
er’s judgments are influenced by concerns for customer relationships and sales volume. It is possible that the presi-
dent’s perceptions of industrial environments, such as changes in customer preferences, may not be sufficiently in-
formed by field sales feedback about customers or competitors. Given the technical/production backgrounds of most 
small manufacturing firm presidents (Pelham and Clayson, 1988), these presidents may overestimate product diffe-
rentiation, underestimate customer segment differentiation, and leading to strategies based on investments in process 
or product based technology. The sales manager’s role may lead to underestimation of product differentiation, over-
estimation of customer segment differences, and overestimation of competitive intensity leading to strategies em-
phasizing price cutting or investments in marketing. Therefore study of the influence of environment perceptions on 
strategy should include the judgments of both types of managers, and not just firm presidents. 
 
 Thus, the purposes of this study are to extend Miller’s (1988) study by measuring the associations between: 
small business manager’s perceptions of environmental technical/market turbulence and emphasis on 
growth/differentiation strategy or low cost strategy, 2. Their perceptions of environmental product/customer diffe-
rentiation and emphasis on growth/differentiation strategy or low cost strategy, and 3. Their perceptions of environ-
mental competitive intensity and emphasis on growth/differentiation strategy or low cost strategy. We will compare 
the consistency of associations across presidents and sales managers and discuss possible reasons for inconsistency. 
 
Previous Research on Perceptual Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Environmental uncertainty has been defined in terms of an individual's perceived inability to understand the 
direction in which an environment might be changing (Milliken, 1987). From the perspective of this individual, 
measures of perception allow researchers to depict an organization’s environment.  For example, environments per-
ceived as highly uncertain will likely be viewed as very risky, as contexts in which a few erroneous decisions could 
result in severe trouble and possibly put the survival of the organization at risk.  An environment perceived in such a 
way would tend to generate a high degree of stress and anxiety and a lack of assuredness on the part of an organiza-
tion's manager (Waldman, Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001:134).  The manager may be unable to fully compre-
hend the potential impact of those changes on the organization, and whether or not particular responses to the envi-
ronment might be successful. 
 
Managers often respond to uncertainty or complexity in decision-making by simplifying their decision 
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processes, which may lead to cognitive biases and systematic errors (Hitt & Barr, 1989). Michael (1973) wrote that 
faced with uncertainty that cannot be reduced or eliminated, some managers may choose to perceive their environ-
ment as more certain than it is in actuality.  Bourgeois (1985) recommended that firms faced with volatility confront 
it directly.  Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck (1976) wrote that avoidance of uncertainty would impede the organiza-
tion's long-term ability to adapt and survive.  
 
Perceived ineffectiveness may be seen as evidence of not knowing how to deal with the environment, i.e., 
not being in control (Pfeffer, 1981; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). This connection between perceived environmental 
uncertainty and effectiveness is typically explained in both the strategic management (e.g., Hambrick, 1983; Miller, 
1988) and organization theory (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; Duncan, 1972) literatures, using ideas from contin-
gency theory.  
 
Contingency theory assumes that the environment poses certain information processing, resource, or legi-
timacy demands on the organization. These demands, in turn, are either met or not met through the organization's 
structure, strategy or some combination of the two, leading to different levels of organizational effectiveness 
(McCabe & Dutton, 1993:624). If decision makers construct the environment as complex and unstable, then they 
have a reasonable explanation to offer others that explains a less-than-satisfactory performance, while doing minim-
al damage to their public image of effectiveness and control. 
 
Treating environmental uncertainty as an independent variable, decision makers who view their firm or unit 
as ineffective, McCabe and Dutton (1993) posit, will see their organization's environment as more uncertain. When 
a unit or organization is performing poorly in a decision maker's eyes, he/she feels the need to explain or provide an 
account for this less than ideal situation (Hewitt & Hall, 1973). One possible response is to blame the situation on 
the environment by constructing it as highly uncertain, thus accounting for the effectiveness gap while, at the same 
time, maintaining a more positive self-image and some sense of control (Salancik & Meindl, 1984).  
 
Hambrick & Snow (1977) suggest that a firm's strategy will lead executives to selectively misperceive as-
pects of their environment. This leads to varying discrepancies between archival and perceptual measures across 
specific strategic foci. Managers may misperceive their environment, a condition analogous to Type I or Type II er-
rors in statistical inference. A Type I error or a false positive condition, occurs when a firm perceives more uncer-
tainty than actually occurs. A Type II error or failure to detect occurs when a firm fails to notice uncertainty in its 
environment (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed: 1993). 
 
Studies reporting relationships between organizational structure and perceived uncertainty have been in-
consistent. Higher levels of perceived uncertainty reported in organic versus mechanistic structures (Leifer & Huber, 
1977) but also a negative relationship between centralization and perceived uncertainty (Connelly, 1975).  Huber, 
O’Connell, and Cummings (1975) wrote that formalized hierarchies was found to be positively related to perceived 
uncertainty. How managers perceive their environment is more critical to organizational strategy, structure, and 
process than are archival measures of the environment (Hambrick & Snow, 1977; Miller, 1988). Yet, Dess and 
Keats (1987) found executives of firms with mechanistic structures reported better accuracy and consensus between 
archival and perceptual measures. 
 
Even with all data points of environmental indices equally weighted, the more recent events will have a 
greater impact on managerial perceptions. Archival measures, which measure long-term trends, are not as likely to 
influence managerial decisions as the current state of the firm’s environment. However, Wholey and Brittain (1989) 
postulate that the impact of recency on managerial perceptions may be minimized if there is evidence of systematic 
environmental variation over a period of time. In their study of the restaurant industry, using monthly data, they 
found that managerial perceptions were strongly influenced by the seasonality of sales data. 
 
Differing environmental assumptions are associated with Miles and Snow (1978) proposed strategic pers-
pectives of analyzer, prospector, defender, and reactor. A senior manager in a defender organization, for example, 
"perceives the environment as analyzable and stable and the management is determined to protect what it has," while 
prospectors view the environment as "changing and as containing opportunities" (Daft & Weick, 1984: 292). Given 
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these differences in internal versus external focus, one would expect a greater potential for environmental misper-
ceptions among defenders or reactors, relative to analyzers.  
 
 A similar case can be made for Porter's (1980) generic strategies. Organizations that pursue the generic 
strategy of overall cost leadership seek to become the lowest cost producers in the industry. By emphasizing cost 
control, such organizations aim to make above average returns even with low prices (Porter, 1980).  A cost leader-
ship strategy focuses on the creation of internal efficiencies that will help them withstand external pressures.  Con-
sequently, product development and entrepreneurial decisions become secondary to issues like process engineering 
or the routinization of information systems. In firms pursuing cost leadership, a greater potential for misperception 
of the external environment among executives would be anticipated (Boyd, Dess, & Rasheed, 1993:204). A cost 
leadership strategy is appropriate in a stable and predictable environment. This is because unpredictable environ-
ments may create severe diseconomies for organizations pursuing a low cost strategy as they attempt to control costs 
and improve efficiency (Miller, 1988). 
 
 Porter’s generic strategy of differentiation aims at creating differentiated and unique products/services that 
will satisfy the customer's unique needs. Such organizations hope to create brand loyalty for their offerings, and 
thus, price inelasticity on the part of buyers. Breadths of product or service offerings, technology, special features, or 
customer service are popular approaches to differentiation. The differentiation strategy must typically be supported 
by heavy investment in research, product or service design and marketing (Kumar & Subramanian, 1998: 108). Dif-
ferentiation often involves new technologies, unforeseen customer and competitor reaction and is associated with 
dynamic and uncertain environments (Miller, 1988).  
 
 Kumar and Subramanian (1998) found that the level of uncertainty reported in different sectors of the envi-
ronment is different between organizations pursuing a differentiation strategy and those pursuing a cost leadership 
strategy. An organization pursuing a differentiation strategy will report greater environmental uncertainty than or-
ganizations pursuing a cost leadership strategy.   
 
 Kim and Lim (1988) found that different organizations within the same industry face different environmen-
tal constraints and contingencies based on their competitive strategies, and accordingly have their unique percep-
tions of the environment. It could be expected that organizations would report greater concern for uncertainty in 
those sectors of the environment that are most relevant to them, simply because changes within these sectors may 
impose important constraints on their planning, decision making and strategy implementation (Bourgeois, 1980). 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Influences of Industry Technical/Market Turbulence 
 
 Porter’s (1980) differentiation strategy aims to create a product that customers see as unique, which results 
in increased price inelasticity, higher margins, and reduction in buyer power. Miller (1986) suggests that differentia-
tion strategies could be based on product innovation or based on intensive marketing management. As firms increase 
use of these strategies there are increases in environmental turbulence. A strategy that emphasized marketing diffe-
rentiation and innovation should be more necessary in turbulent environments (Porter, 1980; Miller, 1988) such as 
the computer industry. If a firm, in such an environment, fails to keep pace with industry innovation and fails to ag-
gressively seek new markets for innovations, the firm will fall behind, losing market share and sales (Miller, 1988).  
Miller suggests that a low cost strategy is associated with stable and predictable environments, such as the metals 
industry, where customers see the product as a commodity and where price is the dominant competitive tool. He 
suggests that a turbulent environment will create severe diseconomies for firms pursuing a low cost strategy because 
the many alterations needed to cope with external challenges would thwart efficiency. Miller’s study of manufactur-
ing firm presidents found positive correlations between industry dynamism and strategies of differentiation via in-
novation (.27, p< .01) and marketing based differentiation (.21, p< .05). His study’s data did not support the hy-
pothesized negative relationship between dynamism and cost leadership strategy, which may have been due to sam-
ple size (89) or due to the sample of small firms (average $10 million), which may have precluded pursuing a low 
cost strategy.  Pickle and Abrahamson (1976) argued that there are no generally superior price-setting strategies for 
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small firms because they are generally precluded from offering the lowest prices in the industry. This is due to fi-
nancial constraints restricting pursuit of economies of scale or cost reductions from process-based RT&D. The fol-
lowing hypotheses are similar to Miller’s. We would expect that both elements of dynamism, industry technical tur-
bulence (production technology and new products) and market turbulence (changes in customer needs) would influ-
ence managers to emphasize a strategy of heavy investment in product design and or marketing to maximize growth 
in current or new markets. Thus:  
 
1. Growth/differentiation strategy is positively associated with perceptions of: 
2.  
a) Industry Technical Turbulence 
b) Industry Market Turbulence 
 
2. Low cost strategy is negatively associated with perceptions of: 
3.  
a) Industry Technical Turbulence 
b) Industry Market Turbulence 
 
Influences of Industry Technical/Market Turbulence 
 
 Sheth (1985) suggests that different types of competitive structures are emerging in business markets. 
Commodity markets, such as basic metals, are characterized by low customer and product differentiation. In these 
commodity markets the driving force for competitive advantage is seeking economies of scale and other methods to 
secure low costs. At the other extreme of Sheth’s continuum of business markets are fragmented markets with high 
customer and product differentiation, such as electronics and instruments. In these markets, the driving force for 
competitive advantage is ultra specialization.  
 
 Differentiated markets, such as industrial machinery, are characterized by a high level of product differen-
tiation, but a low level of customer differentiation. In these markets, the driving force for competitive advantage is 
R&D success.  Segmented markets, such as fabricated metals, are characterized by a high level of customer differen-
tiation, but a low level of product differentiation. In these markets application based customization is the driving 
force for competitive advantage. Based on Sheth’s typology we would expect that:  
 
H3. Growth/differentiation strategy is positively associated with perceptions of: 
 
a) Industry Product Differentiation 
b) Industry Customer Differentiation 
 
H4 Low cost strategy is negatively associated with perceptions of: 
 
a) Industry Product Differentiation 
b) Industry Customer Differentiation 
 
Influences of Industry Competitive Intensity 
 
 Porter (1980) argued that the bargaining power of suppliers, threat of potential entrants, the bargaining 
power of customers, and the threat of substitute products influences the level of competitive intensity among exist-
ing firms. High levels of competitive intensity are characterized by high levels of fixed costs, commodity products, a 
large number of competitors, and high exit barriers. In these industries, price competition is prevalent to maintain 
the volumes necessary to achieve economies of scale and cover high overhead costs. In these industries, firm presi-
dents tend to emphasize cost cutting and efficiency, while sales managers rely on lower price to secure orders. Per-
ceptions of a competitively intense industry will influence managers to emphasize a low cost strategy over a 
growth/differentiation strategy.  
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Thus: 
 
H5A. Growth/differentiation strategy is negatively associated with perceptions of industry competitive intensity. 
H5B. Low cost strategy is positively associated with perceptions of industry competitive intensity. 
 
 Waller, Huber, and Glick’s (1995) study of senior executives provided evidence for this expectation. They 
found that functional area work experience has no effect on which changes top executives perceive in their organiza-
tions’ environments. Thus: 
 
Method 
 
 Twelve hundred industrial manufacturing firms were selected from Ward's Directory for the mailing of 
mail surveys. These firms were selected on the basis of size ($20-200 million in sales), ownership (wholly owned), 
and industry environment (commodity or specialty). Commodity and specialty SIC codes were selected to provide 
as wide a variance as possible on environmental dimensions. The commodity products industries selected were plas-
tics, fabricated and basic metals, packaging, and chemicals. The specialty product industries selected were instru-
ments, machinery, and electronic/electrical equipment.  
 
 Two hundred and seventy firms (22.5%) returned questionnaires, however only one hundred and forty eight 
firms (12.3%) sent in responses from both the president and the sales manager and completed all survey items. The 
mean size of firms responding to the survey was $30 million in sales. Chi square tests of industry S.I.C. code com-
position and t-tests of firm size for responding and non-responding firms indicated no significant differences.  
 
 The presidents and national sales managers of these firms were sought as respondents because of the presi-
dent’s key role in strategy formulation and the sales manager’s key role in strategy execution.  
 
 The perceptual measures of the industry competitive environment were drawn from previous market orien-
tation studies (Pelham and Wilson, 1996; Jaworski and Kohli, 1991; Narver and Slater, 1990). These perceptual 
measures were technical turbulence/market turbulence (reflecting dynamism), product differentiation/customer dif-
ferentiation (reflecting complexity), and competitive intensity (Porter, 1979; reflecting munificence). The elements 
of product and customer differentiation are suggested as critical determinants of strategy and competitive advantage 
in industrial markets (Sheth, 1985) and similar top Miller’s (1988) measures of environmental heterogeneity. The 
measures of technological and market turbulence are similar to perceived instability measures suggested by Duncan 
(1972) and Bourgeois (1985). These perceptual measures reflect objective measures that formed dimensions found 
by Dess and Beard (1984).  
 
All questionnaire items selected to measure key constructs were subjected to tests for reliability and con-
vergent/discriminant validity using coefficient alpha and confirmatory (maximum likelihood-varimax rotation) fac-
tor analysis. A pretest of 50 respondents was conducted and items were purified using principal components factor 
analysis 
 
Appendix 1 provides these measures of the industry environment along with coefficient alpha/item correla-
tions, confirmatory factor analysis (Varimax-correlated factors) loadings, means, and standard deviations. All survey 
measures were based on a seven-point scale. Both semantic differential and agree-disagree scales were used. The 
coefficient alpha for competitive intensity was .76 for the president’s responses and .96 for the sales manager’s res-
ponses. The coefficient alpha for the combined technical and market turbulence construct was .60 for the president 
and .46 for the sales manager, so the construct was split into two variables. For similar reasons the combined cus-
tomer and product differentiation factor was split into separate variables. Factor loadings indicated good discrimi-
nant validity.  
 
The measures of generic strategy (Porter, 1980) were utilized in Narver and Slater’s (1990) market orienta-
tion study. These strategy constructs are growth/differentiation strategy and low cost strategy. The measures for 
growth/differentiation strategy reflect Miller’s suggestion that there are two types of differentiation strategy, based 
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on product innovation, and based on intensive marketing. Appendix 2 provides these measures of strategy with their 
statistics. 
 
Because of the two-way influences of strategy and environment, Pearson bi-variate correlation analysis was 
utilized to test hypotheses. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the responses of the president and sales manager on measures of envi-
ronment and strategy with average differences and correlations. The correlations between the president’s responses 
and sales manager’s responses for the competitive intensity, technical turbulence, and market turbulence were higher 
(54, .45, and .43; p< .001) than the correlations for customer and product differentiation (.24, .23; p< .01). The mean 
differences for measures of environment were not significant, with the exception of technical turbulence (.25, p< 
.05).  
 
The correlation between the respondents for the measure of growth/differentiation strategy was higher (.44, 
p< .001) than the correlation for the measure for low cost strategy (.36, p< .01). The mean differences between res-
pondents on the environment constructs were not significant, with the exception of technical turbulence (.25, p< 
.05). The mean differences for strategy responses were not significant.  
 
Despite the significant correlations of responses and the non-significant differences in responses, it would 
have been expected that the level of correlations of environment would have been higher for two senior managers in 
small firms for critical input to strategy determination. It would also have been expected that the correlation of re-
ports on the firm’s realized strategy would have been higher.  
 
 Table 2 provides correlations between technical and market turbulence and reported strategy. The correla-
tion between Technical Turbulence and Growth/Differentiation strategy is positive (.33) and significant (p< .001), 
leading to acceptance of H1A. The correlation between Technical Turbulence and Low Cost strategy is negative (-
.14) and significant (p< .05), leading to acceptance of H2A. 
 
The correlation between Market Turbulence and Growth/Differentiation strategy is positive (.42) and sig-
nificant (p< .001), leading to acceptance of H1B. The correlation between Market Turbulence and Low Cost strategy 
is negative (-.13) and significant (p< .05), leading to acceptance of H2B. 
 
The correlation between Product Differentiation and Growth/Differentiation strategy is positive (.18) and 
significant (p< .05), leading to acceptance of H3A. However, neither the product differentiation perception of the 
sales manager or the president is significantly correlated with the sales manager’s report on Growth/Differentiation 
strategy. The correlation between Product Differentiation and Low Cost strategy is negative (-.08) but not signifi-
cant, leading to rejection of H4A. However, there is a significant negative correlation (-.16, p< .05) between the 
sales manager’s perceptions of product differentiation and the sales manager’s reports of low cost strategy. There is 
also a significant negative correlation (-.26, p< .05) between the president’s perceptions of product differentiation 
and the sales manager’s reports of low cost strategy. This raises doubts as to conclusions about the influence of in-
dustry product differentiation and strategy determination.  
 
The correlation between Customer Differentiation and Growth/Differentiation strategy is positive (.08) but 
not significant, leading to rejection of H3B. However, the sales manager’s customer differentiation perception has 
significant and positive correlations with reported use of that strategy by both the president (.24, p< .01) and the 
sales manager (.25, p< .01). The correlation between Customer Differentiation and Low Cost strategy is positive 
(.04) and not significant, leading to rejection of H4B. However, customer differentiation perceptions by the presi-
dent and sales manager have significant (p< .05) correlations with the sales manager’s reported use of that strategy (-
.14, -.15).  
 
Thus the results of this study provide qualified support for Sheth’s product differentiation/customer diffe-
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rentiation typology. His hypothesized emphases on growth/differentiation or low cost strategy depending on the na-
ture of extent of customer and product differentiation have greater support based on the sales manager’s environ-
ment perceptions and reported use of strategy. 
 
The correlation between Competitive Intensity and Growth/Differentiation strategy is positive and not sig-
nificant, leading to rejection of H5A. The correlation of Competitive Intensity and Low Cost strategy is positive and 
not significant, leading to rejection of H5B. However, the perceptions of competitive intensity held by both manag-
ers are positively associated with the sales manager’s reported usage of low cost strategy (18, p< .01; .16, p< .05).  
 
The similarity of associations, across the two manager’s reports, between technical turbulence, market tur-
bulence, and use of growth/differentiation or low cost strategy leads to acceptance of hypotheses 6A, 6B, 6C, and 
6D. However the dissimilarity of associations, across the two manager’s reports, between product differentiation, 
customer differentiation, and competitive intensity and use of growth/differentiation or low cost strategy leads to re-
jection of hypotheses 6E, 6F, 6G, and 6J. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The consistent positive and significant correlations of technical and market turbulence with use of 
growth/differentiation strategy, across the reports of presidents and sales managers, replicates Miller’s (1985) find-
ings of significant correlations between the general dimension of dynamism and use of R&D based or marketing 
based differentiation strategy. The consistent negative and significant correlations of technical and market turbu-
lence with use of low cost strategy, across the reports of presidents and sales managers, differs from Miller’s lack of 
support for these hypothesized influences. The significant results in this study are probably due to larger sample size 
in this study (148 firms versus 80 in Millers study). 
 
 The lack of consensus between presidents and sales managers as to the nature of customer and product dif-
ferentiation and their implications for strategy does not necessarily refute Sheth’s arguments for the driving forces in 
industrial markets. Using the sales manager’s reports, correlations confirm the positive influence of customer diffe-
rentiation on growth/differentiation strategy and negative influence on low cost strategy. Use of the president’s per-
ception of industry product differentiation confirms the positive influence on reported use of growth differentiation 
strategy. Using the sales manager’s reported use of low cost strategy, the negative influence of product differentia-
tion is confirmed. However, the roles of these two managers may influence the implications for perceptions of prod-
uct/customer differentiation and for competitive intensity.  
 
 Because of the boundary-spanning role of the sales force, the national sales manager should be a critical 
source of information about the nature of the competitive environment. The president’s judgments as to the nature of 
the environment should be influenced by interactions with the sales-manager, field reports, market research, and in-
dustry publications. Because both small business managers should have significant interactions with each other, per-
ceptions of environment characteristics and their implications should be discussed, leading to a reasonable level of 
consensus as to the nature of key environment characteristics and their implications.   
 
Pelham and Clayson (1988) found that the top managers of small industrial firms devoted little time to 
marketing decision-making, compared to internal decision making such as production. The president’s typical tech-
nical/production background may cause him/her to overemphasize technical differences in product features and the 
implications of those differences, while the supervision of customer contact personnel role of the sales manager may 
cause him/her to underestimate differences in product benefits based on customer feedback. The sales manager’s 
role in adapting sales strategies to types of customers may influence him/her to overestimate customer differences 
and the implications of those differences. The sales manager’s experiences in pricing negotiations with customers 
may influence that manager to be more sensitive to its role in strategy in competitively intense environments.  
 
The results from this study provide evidence of these role influences. The implication for small business 
managers is that presidents and sales managers should be aware of potential functional biases in environmental 
scanning and strategy formulation and resolve differences in perceptions prior to strategy implementation.   
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 The consistency and strength of correlations between perception of the environment and chosen strategy is 
also influenced by other factors in strategy choice, such as the firm’s perceived distinctive competency, resources, 
market position, target market, level of diversification, and the values of senior managers. Given these influences, 
environment characteristics may have a lesser influence on strategy choice, especially for smaller firms. Snow and 
Hrebiniak (1980) found that a successful strategy has to be supported with an appropriate reward system, structure, 
and distinctive competency. Pelham’s study (1999) of small manufacturing firms concluded that the appropriate 
match of growth/differentiation strategy to a turbulent environment may be a necessary, but not sufficient condition, 
for higher profitability for these firms, since the correlation was significantly higher in the lowest performing quar-
tile (.50) compared to the highest performing quartile (.34). This result was opposite Miller’s results, which found 
that the correlation was higher in the successful sub-sample. His study found that a market-oriented culture is more 
strongly correlated with growth/differentiation strategy in the highest profitability group (.42), compared to the low-
est group (.24). This result confirms Porter’s (1980) argument that a growth/differentiation strategy requires good 
management understanding of customer preferences and competing products.   
 
The managers in this study may have been somewhat unsure of the emphasis on growth/differentiation 
strategy or low/cost strategy because of a mixture of elements of these strategies in everyday tactics, because of pe-
riodic shifts between emphasis on the strategies, and because strategy may not be considered the primary determi-
nant of firm success. Covin and Slevin (1989) explained the minimal performance variance explained by strategy in 
their models by suggesting that internal cohesiveness and consistency of management practices may provide strong-
er links to performance. The lower than expected consensus between presidents and sales managers as to the nature 
of customer and product differentiation and their implications for strategy does not necessarily imply that low levels 
of consensus as to the nature of environment characteristics leads to poor firm performance. Bourgeois (1985) found 
that perceptual disagreement within a top management team as to environmental uncertainty and goal diversity led 
to greater firm performance. The basis for this result was avoiding Janis’s (1972) exhortation to avoid the perils of 
groupthink (insulation, arrogance, tunnel vision, blindness, and omnipotence). However, this positive influence of 
diversity only occurred when the mean perceived environmental uncertainty is congruent with the objective industry 
volatility level. This happened because his study indicated a negative relationship between firm performance and di-
vergence between perceived environment uncertainty and objectively measured industry volatility. If the sales man-
ager has more accurate perceptions of environment characteristics, due to his/her closeness to the marketplace, and 
the president fails to base strategic choice on those more accurate perceptions, the result will be inappropriate strate-
gy and poor firm performance. Inaccurate perceptions of technical turbulence and product differentiation lead to in-
adequate investment or over-investment in R&D. Inaccurate market turbulence or customer differentiation percep-
tions lead to an inappropriate level of new product development. Inaccurate perceptions of competitive intensity 
leads to over or under-emphasis on cost based strategies and poor target market selection. 
 
Limitations/Future Studies 
 
It is important to stress that this study was preliminary and exploratory.  Environment characteristics were 
the only variables used in this study to measure associations of managerial perceptions with strategy from different 
key functions. Future studies should include other environment characteristics such as industry growth. Future stu-
dies should include other factors such as perceived distinctive competency, market position, firm culture, and firm 
structure. However, this paper highlighted a need for further research that would measure the impact on firm per-
formance created by differences between the president and sales manager in their perceptions of the internal and ex-
ternal situation characteristics and strategy. Subsequent research should also compare the correlations of environ-
ment perceptions to objective measures of environment characteristics across functions and hierarchies.    
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Table 1 
Mean Differences and Correlations Of Variables Based on 
Presidents’ and Sales Managers’ Responses (n = 148) 
 
   President Minus  Standard   Variable 
   Sales Manager  Error         T  Correlation 
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Competitive Intensity  -.06     .09        -.62     .54*** 
Technical Turbulence   .25     .13   1.96*     .45*** 
Market Turbulence    .10     .11     .91       .43*** 
Customer Differentiation  -.11     .19    -.57       .24** 
Product Differentiation   .11     .18     .61      .23** 
Growth/Differentiation Strategy -.14     .11  -1.24     .44*** 
Low Cost Strategy    .22     .17   1.36     .36*** 
Note: Significance: * = p< .05; ** = P< .01; ***= p< .001. 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlations of Industry Turbulence Perceptions and 
Perceived Strategy (n = 148) 
Environment Perceptions 
Strategy Technical 
Turbulence- 
President 
Technical 
Turbulence-Sales 
Manager 
Market 
Turbulence- 
President 
Market 
Turbulence- 
Sales 
Manager 
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy- President 
.33*** .24** .42*** .28** 
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy-Sales Mgr. 
.20** .25** .25** .34** 
Low Cost Strategy-
President 
-.14* -.13* -.13* -.14* 
Low Cost Strategy- 
Sales Manager 
-.18* -.19** -.22** -.24** 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlations of Industry Differentiation Perceptions and 
Perceived Strategy (n = 148) 
Environment Perceptions 
Strategy Product 
Differentiation- 
President 
Product Differentia-
tion- 
Sales Manager 
Customer Differen-
tiation- 
President 
Customer 
Differentiation- 
Sales Manager 
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy- President 
.18* .05 .08 .24** 
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy-Sales Mgr. 
.13* .09 .05 .25** 
Low Cost Strategy-
President 
-.08 -.03 .04 -.07 
Low Cost Strategy- 
Sales Manager 
-.26** -.16* -.14* -.15* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Correlations of Industry Competitive Intensity Perceptions and 
Perceived Strategy (n = 148) 
Environment Perceptions 
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Appendix 1 
Perceptual Measures of Environment 
 
Alpha/Item     Factor Analysis 
Correlation           Loading 
President  Sales Manager    President Sales Manager  
Industry Competitive Environment  
Competitive Intensity   .76   .96 
1. Intensity of competition   .56   .62  .94  .73 
2. Frequency of price wars   .70   .94  .87  .76 
3. Frequency of new   .59   .65  .89  .61 
    competitive moves  
Tech/Market Turbulence   .68     .90    
4. Change in production 
    service technology   .60   .46  .88  .50  
5. Number of new products 
    from tech. breakthroughs    .66   1.02  .85  .42    
6. Extent of change in 
    customer product preferences   .67   .26  .90  .67    
7. Extent customers look 
    for new products    .60   .24  .85  .85  
Customer/Product Differentiation       .88 
8. Customer difference in   .40   .31  .86  .58  
    size, needs, and buying 
9. Similarity of products   .40   .31  .86  .52  
 
Means of Variables 
           Standard  
        Mean    Deviation  
Product Differentiation (P)     3.50    1.55   
Product Differentiation (S)     3.59    1.58  
Customer Differentiation (P)     4.31    1.60   
Customer Differentiation (S)     4.37    1.57  
Technical Turbulence (P)     3.58    1.44  
Technical Turbulence (S)     3.74    1.35  
Perceived Market  
Competitive Intensity (P)     4.83    1.01 
Competitive Intensity (S)     4.81    1.04  
 
Notes:     1. All correlations are significant at the p<. 001 level 
                2. Fit of factor analysis (varimax-maximum likelihood) models:  
3 environment factors sufficient; President: Chi-2=36, d.f. 25, p=. 08; Sales Manager: Chi-2=10, d.f. 12, p=. 65. Based 
on these results, technical/market turbulence as well as product/customer differentiation was split into separate con-
structs.   
 
Appendix 2 
Measures of Strategy 
 
     Alpha/Item   Factor Analysis 
     Correlation   Loading 
Strategy Competitive 
Intensity- 
President 
Competitive Intensity-- 
Sales Manager 
Growth/Differentiation Strategy- President .08 -.08 
Growth/Differentiation Strategy-Sales Mgr. -.02 -.07 
Low Cost Strategy-President .05 .04 
Low Cost Strategy- Sales Manager .18** .16* 
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President  Sales Manager President Sales Manager 
Growth/Differentiation Strategy  .77  .94   
Heavy Investment in Product design and/or .69  .88  .64  .71  
marketing to maximize growth 
Penetrate new markets with existing  .69  .83  .61  .67 
products 
  
Low Cost Strategy   .74  .95 
Being low cost producer would give firm  
an unassailable competitive advantage .69  .89  .59  .69 
Our objectives are driven primarily by 
cost reduction    .73  .87  .63  .66 
 
 
Means of Variables 
           Standard  
         Mean   Deviation     
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy (P)       4.31   1.60  
Growth/Differentiation 
Strategy (S)       4.19   1.51  
Low Cost Strategy (P)      4.33   1.45 
Low Cost Strategy (S)      4.23   1.44  
 
 
Appendix 3 
Correlations of Environment Constructs 
      1    2   3   4   5 
 
1. Competitive Intensity (P) 1.00  
2. Competitive Intensity (S)      54 1.00 
3. Turbulence            (P)     .08  -.04  1.00 
4. Turbulence            (S)    -.06  .03  .44 1.00 
5. Differentiation            (P)     -.04 -.11 .30   .20 1.00 
6. Differentiation            (S) -.06 -.06 .27   .39  .24 
 
Notes. 1. P = President; S = Sales Manager.  2. Correlations over .12 significant at p< .05 level; correlations over .21 
significant at p< .01 level; correlations over .29 significant at p<. 001 level. 
